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CURRENT DECISIONS
standards of fairness afforded in criminal proceedings via the due process
and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, changes in
the McNally prematurity rule seem almost certain. While it is debatable
whether the Supreme Court will go to the limits that the Fourth Circuit
has gone, it is nevertheless clear that the Fourth Circuit has lighted a
path which the Supreme Court may choose to follow.
Labor Law-UNIoN AUTHORIZATION CARDS. In NLRB v. S. S. Logan
Packing Co.,' a union had sought to organize the employees of a food
packing company. The union obtained signed authorization cards from
a majority of the employees and then requested a bargaining conference
with the company's president. The president refused the request,2 and
the union filed charges of violations of §§ 8(a) (1)3 and 8(a) (5)4 of the
National Labor Relations Act. The National Labor Relations Board
found that the union represented a clear majority of employees and that
the employer could have had no good faith doubt of this fact.5 The
other present restraint. The right to seek relief from an invalid conviction
and sentence ought to exist:
(i) even though the applicant has not yet commenced service of the chal-
lenged sentence;
(ii) even though the applicant has completely served the challenged
sentence;
(il) even though the challenged sentence did not commit the applicant to
prison, but was rather a fine, probation, or suspended sentence.
ABA STANDAms RELATING To Posr-CoNvicnoNq REMEDIES § 2.3 (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1967). It is interesting to note that Judge Sobeloff, the author of the Martin opinion
and also sitting on this present case before the Fourth Circuit, was chairman of the
ABA Advisory Committee.
1. 386 F.2d 563 (4th Cir. 1967).
2. The company also filed a formal charge of coercive practices by the union in the
use of threats to obtain signatures on authorization cards. These charges were dis-
missed by the NLRB, but did have a bearing on Logan's good faith in withholding
recognition of the union.
3. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7 . . . ." Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act)
§ 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1964).
4. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject
to the provisions of section 9(a)." Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act)
§ 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964). See note 6, infra, for § 9(a).
5. It was found that the employer could have had no good faith doubt despite the
fact that four years earlier the union had claimed to represent a majority of the em-
ployees, but thereupon had lost a consent election, the validity of which is unchallenged.
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Board therefore ordered the employer to bargain with the union, and
the employer appealed.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that since
the Taft-Hartley Amendments had specifically repealed the part of
the NLRA which had authorized the Board to employ "any other suit-
able method" of resolving questions of representation, 6 the Board was
restricted to the use of secret ballots, and therefore could not issue a
compulsory bargaining order merely on the basis of a majority of
signed authorization cards.7
The National Labor Relations Act enables the NLRB to force em-
ployers to accept collective bargaining with a union when it is desired
by a majority of employees." Specifically provided for is a secret ballot
election, 9 in which, should the, union get a majority of votes, the em-
ployer must recognize it as representing the employees'0 or be liable
6. Prior to 1947, § 9(c) of the Wagner Act mpowered the Board, in deciding a
question of representation, to "take' A s66ret ballot of employees or utilize any other
suitable method to ascertin [sic] such representative." National Labor Relations Act
(1935). However, the Taft-Hartley Amendments deleted the phrase, "or utilize any
other suitable method," leaving only the secret ballot provision. Labor Management
Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 9(c), 29 U.S.C. S 159(c).
7. See Note, Union" Authorization Cards, 75" YALE L. J. 805 (1966).
8. "Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit 'appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collec-
tive bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other con-
ditions of employment ... " Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act)
§9(a), 29 U.S.C. S 159(a) (1964).
9. "Wherever a petition'shall have been filed, in accordance with such regulations as
may be prescribed by the Board-
(A) by an employee or group of employees or any individual or labor organization
acting in their behalf alleging that a substantial number of employees (i) wish to be
represented for collective bargaining and that their employer declines to recognize their
representative as the representative defined in section 9(a), or (ii) assert that the
individual or labor organization, which has been certified or is being currently recog-
nized by their employer as the bargaining representative, is no longer a representative
as defined in section 9 (a); or
(B) by an employer, alleging thai one or more individuals or labor organizations
have presented to him a claim to be recognized as the representative defined in section
9(a).... If the Board finds . . . that . . . a question of representation exists, it shall
direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof." Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act (Taft-Hardey Act § 9(c), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1964).
10. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encoiirage or discourage membership in any labor organi-
zation . . . ." Labor Management Relitions Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(a) (3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a) (3) (1964).
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to a compulsory bargaining order from the Board." However, in ad-
dition to a secret ballot vote, the Board allows the unions an additional
method of attaining representative status through the use of signed
authorization cards12 secured from a majority of employees.
The initial case establishing union authorization cards as an appropriate
basis for representation was Fravzks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 3 which upheld
the propriety of the compulsory bargaining remedy for an improper
refusal of recognition upon presentation of a majority of signed authori-
zation cards. Later, Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB 4 established guide-
lines as to what constituted an improper refusal to recognize the ma-
jority represented by the cards. Under Joy Silk, the union may prove
either:
(1) the employer could have had no good faith doubt of the union's
majority status at the time the cards were presented; or,
(2) subsequent misconduct by the employer dissipated the union's
strength.' 5
The phrase "subsequent misconduct" has been extended by the courts
to include practically any kind of an employer investigation aimed at
discovering the validity of the union's claim to majority status as evi-
denced by the authorization cards. 16 However, if the employer does
not investigate it would appear that he does not doubt that the ma-
ll. ". . . If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the
opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any
such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall
issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease
and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including
reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies
of the Act." Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 10(c), 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(c) (1964).
12. An authorization card is usually a printed form giving the union authority to
represent the employee signing it in collective bargaining with the employer. For
examples, see Lewis, The Use and Abuse of Authorization Cards in Determining Union
Majority, 16 LAB. L. J. 434 (1965).
13. 321 U.S. 702 (1944).
14. 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951).
15. This allegation is most frequently used by the union, since it amounts to a nearly
conclusive presumption of bad faith on the part of the employer.
16. See, NLRB v. 4id-lVest Towel and Linen Service, Inc., 339 F.2d 958 (7th Cir.
1964) (questioning about union activity); Tony R. Santangelo, 154 N.L.R.B. 1649
(1965) (unilateral grants of economic benefits); Piggly Wiggley El Dorado Co., 154
N.L.R.B. 445 (1965) (surveillance); Samuel B. Gass, 154 N.L.R.B. 728 (1965) (threats);
B.B.S.A., Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. 477 (1965) (discriminatory discharge); Bause Super Drug
Stores, Inc., 150 N.L.R.B. 1634 (1965) (promises of economic benefits); Bauer Welding
& Metal Fabricators, Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. 954 (1965) (encouraging company unions).
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jority of his employees favor unionization. Thus, no matter what action
the employer elects to take, the union will find it easy to fit him into one
of the two Joy Silk categories.
This use of authorization cards has been sanctioned in practically
every circuit as an acceptable indicia of union representation despite
the fact that the Taft-Hartley Amendments apparently require secret
ballot.17 However, in NLRB v. S. S. Logan Packing Co.,'8 the Fourth
Circuit has removed the disparity of treatment available under the ma-
jority rule, while overruling a long line of cases holding that cards were
"ample proof of majority representation." 19 In the future, it appears
that, at least in the Fourth Circuit, the NLRB will be unable to impose
a compulsory bargaining order based on authorization cards without
resort to a secret ballot election, except for (1) "those exceptional
cases where the employer's unfair labor practices are so outrageous and
pervasive and of such a nature that their coercive effects cannot be
eliminated by the application of traditional remedies," 20 or (2) where
there can be no good faith doubt on the part of the employer of the
union's majority status.2 '
17. See, e.g., NLRB v. Southbridge Sheet Metal Works, 380 F.2d 851, (1st Cir. 1967);
Jas. H. Mathews & Co. v. NLRB, 354 F.2d 432 (8th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Winn-Dixie
Stores, Inc., 341 F.2d 750 (6th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. American Manufacturing Co. of
Texas, 351 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Philamon Laboratories, Inc., 298 F.2d 176
(2d Cir. 1962).
18. 386 F.2d 563 (4th Cir. 1967).
19. Bilton Insulation, Inc. v. NLRB, 297 F.2d 141 (4th Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Greens-
boro Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 180 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1950); Peoples Motor Express Co.
v. NLRB, 165 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1948); NLRB v. Schmidt Baking Co., 122 F.2d 162
(4th Cir. 1941).
20. 386 F.2d 563 (4th Cir. 1967), at 570. In Crawford Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. NLRB,
386 F.2d 367 (4th Cir. 1967), decided the same day, the Fourth Circuit Court failed to
enforce a compulsory bargaining order of the Board based on a majority of authoriza-
tion cards, despite evidence that the company had employed discriminatory layoffs to
intimidate workers (the union lost the election, 69 to 86).
21. The court granted enforcement in another case decided the same day, NLRB v.
Sehon Stevenson & Co., 386 F.2d 551 (4th Cir. 1967). In this case, the employer
himself had polled the employees, and had obviously found that the card count was
correct. In affirming the Board's decision, the court stated:
If we had no more in this case than the cards and the finding of viola-
tions of §§ 8(a) (1) and (3), the Board's order to bargain would not be en-
forced for the reasons we state today in Logan. The employer's investiga-
tion, however, so conclusively answers the question of the union's majority
and the question of the employer's lack of doubt of it, we think it may
reasonably be said to have settled the representation question. If that
question is settled, if its answer is not dependent upon a choice of permis-
sible inferences, it is within the Board's power to order bargaining without
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